Galerie

of Danzig, if possible in one building, but in any case in one or
-more adjacent buildings. This obviously has nothing to do with
the question whether the activities of the postal service are to be
confined to the interior of the said building or buildings. The
Senate of Danzig itself has in a letter to the High Commissioner,
dated October ~gth, 1922, expressed the opinion that by this part
of the decision only the question of the building (die Gebaudefrage) had been settled.
Clause 3 runs as follows :
\"That communication by this postal, telegraphic and telephonic service must go direct by any route selected by Poland
or any routes agreed upon between the two Governments of
Poland and Danzig under Article 150 of the Convention of
October 24th, 1921, from the one place selected in Danzig territory to the one place or places selected in Polish territory, and
that no postal, telegraphic or telephonic material or messages
can be received or delivered on this route, or these routes,
except in the establishment described in I above.\"
In the opinion of the Court this statement clearly refers to point (d)
of Article 240 of the Warsaw Agreement, that is, to the meaning
of the word \"directly\" (directement) in Article 29 of the Paris
Convention. It only concerns the question of transit and forbids
the acceptance and delivery of postal, telegraphic or telephonic
material or messages on the route or routes through the territory
of the Free City, except in the postal establishment referred to in
clause I.
It follows from these two clauses that Poland may have only
one Post Office and that no postal matter can be accepted or
delivered during the transit through the territory of Danzig or
the transport to or from the port. This is not contested by Poland.
The question whether the Polish Post Office may extend its activities outside the building and set up letter-boxes and collect or
deliver postal matter, as well as the question whether this postal
service can be used by the public, are of course quite different
questions. It is however to be observed that clause 3 referred to
above, although dealing with another point than that which is
now before the Court, has an indirect bearing on the latter when