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The legal effect of Article 168 has been disputed by the Parties.
Poland claims that the article constitutes a pactum de contrahendo,
which lays down certain principles already agreed uponby the Parties
and which imposes upon Danzig an obligation to complete the necessary arrangements for carrying these principles into effect. Danzig,
on the other hand, denies that there is any such obligation, and contends that the list contained in the article is only a programme for
negotiations which either Party is free to enter into or not as she
pleases. The Court is not called upon to express an opinion on this
question. The important point in this connection is that a comparison of (b) and (c) of the article shows that the utilization
by the public of the service to and from the port was contemplated
by the Parties.
It should be remarked that the postal rights granted to Poland
are, by the terms of the agreements, limited to the port of Danzig,
and that she is not entitled, in the absence of special arrangements,
to perform any postal operation outside the limits of the port. The
mere fact that under Article 168, No. I (b), the Parties had in view
the conclusion of special arrangements for private perçons as well
as for Polish authorities and offices outside the limits of the port
shows that, failing such arrangements, the field of activity of the
service is confined to the limits of the port, and that the service
is only intended for the use of the public in the port. In actual
practjce it is, of course, hardly possible to prevent the public outside the port from making use of the service, but in the matter of
distribution outside the post office and delivery within it, an effective control can be exercised.
It has been urged on behalf of Danzig that Poland\'s postal rights
in Danzig constitute a grant in derogation of the postal monopoly
of Danzig, and that the grant must be strictly construed in favour
of Danzig. In the opinion of the Court, the rules as to a strict or
liberal construction of treaty stipulations can be applied only in
cases where ordinary methods of interpretation have failed. It js
a cardinal principle of interpretation that words must be interpreted
in the sense which they would normally have in their context,
unless such interpretation would lead to something unreasonable or
absurd. In the present case, the construction which the Court
has placed on the various treaty stipulations is not only
seasonable, but is also supported by reference to the various